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THE GRIFFIN CASE-POVERTY AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Bertram F. Wilcox and Edward J. Blousteint
In Griffin v. Illinois,' the United States Supreme Court decided that
an indigent man, convicted of armed robbery, was deprived of constitu-
tional rights by a failure of the State of Illinois to provide him with a
free transcript needed for an appeal.
Illinois law allows an appeal as a matter of right. In the circumstances
of Griffin's case a transcript was needed for the exercise of that right.
If Griffin had had money, he could have bought the transcript. If he had
been sentenced to death; or if he had claimed constitutional error in his
trial; or if he had claimed an error appearing on the face of the common
law "mandatory record"; Illinois would have given him his transcript
free. But he had no money; he was sentenced to prison, not death; and
he complained of nothing but non-constitutional errors at his trial. There-
fore, in the circumstances of his case, appeal was barred by poverty.
Like every affirmation of the constitutional rights of even "a single
member of a free people, the Griffin decision brings new vigor to our
democracy. But this particular decision, in our opinion, does much more.
It portends a major advance in the federal supervision of the administra-
tion of justice by the states of the nation, under the fourteenth amend-
ment.2 It promises to stand with Powell v. Alabama3 (the Scottsboro
cases) as a milestone in the treatment of the poor and friendless by the
courts of our land. Although on its facts it involves solely a poor man's
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 66, for biographical data.1 351 U.S. 12, rehearing denied, 351 U.S. 958 (1956). One Crenshaw was tried and
convicted with Griffin; and he joined with Griffin in the legal proceedings. Since all relevant
facts in Crenshaw's case were the same, we shall, for simplicity, treat the case as though
one man only was involved.
2 Section 1 of this Amendment (of 1868) reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. [1] No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; [2] nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; [3] nor deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (Numbering ours.)
3 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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need of a transcript for appeal, its reasoning is broad enough to apply
to many other of the injustices arising from the poverty of litigants in
our courts. The importance of the Griffin case arises from the fact that
for the first time the Supreme Court has addressed itself squarely to the
impact of poverty on constitutional rights under the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
THE DECISION AND THE OPINIONS
Griffin had been tried and convicted of armed robbery in the Criminal
Court of Cook County, Illinois, and sentenced to a long prison term.
Thereafter he moved in that court, as a poor person, for a free steno-
graphic transcript of his trial, with which to appeal.
Illinois law provides that "writs of error in all criminal cases are
writs of right and shall be issued of course."4 But to use this right to
obtain direct review for the correction of errors claimed to have occurred
at a trial, a plaintiff in error must provide a stenographic transcript,
which forms the basis for the bill of exceptions. 5 He must pay for'such
a transcript8 unless he falls within one of three exceptions: (1) a
sentence to death;' (2) an application for a writ of error to correct an
error appearing in the common law "mandatory record" (consisting
merely of indictment, arraignment, plea, verdict, and sentence);8 or
(3) an application to correct a constitutional error (federal or state) in
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction.9
Griffin's motion for a free transcript to make an effective appeal pos-
sible was denied by the Criminal Court of Cook County without a hearing
and without an opinion. Griffin then petitioned that court for the same
relief under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act.:' This statute had
been added in 1949 to furnish a non-technical post-conviction procedure
by which a person in prison could assert substantial denial of his rights,
under the Federal or State Constitution, occurring in the proceedings
which resulted in his conviction. His petition under this act was also
dismissed.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 38, § 769.1 (1955).
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 110, § 101.65 (1955), Supreme Court Rule 65 (being former I11. Rev.
Stat. § 259.70A, Rule 70A (1955), with minor changes not here material.)
6 IIl. Rev. Stat. c. 37, § 163b (1955).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 38, § 769a (1955).
8 See 351 U.S. 12, 13, n.2, citing People v. Loftus, 400 I1. 432, 81 N.E.2d 495 (1948)
and other authorities. The writ of certiorari pending in the Loftus case was dismissed
after the Illinois decision. 337 U.S. 935 (1949).
9 Post-Conviction Hearing Act of 1949, Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 38, §§ 826-32 (1955). A free
transcript is authorized in any case arising under this act, if the presiding judge finds the
prisoner's petition sufficient to require an answer, and if the state's attorney or the court
so instructs the court reporter; or if a petition for writ of error is filed (a procedure which
the act authorized). Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 37, § 163f and c. 38, § 832 (1955).
10 See note 9 supra.
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Griffin's next move was to file a petition for a writ of error in the
Supreme Court of Illinois. He thereby sought review of the dismissal by
the lower court of his petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act."
This petition was denied by the Illinois Supreme Court, with a simple
recital that it presented "no substantial constitutional question .... "
None of the facts alleged were denied by Illinois."2 Upon application,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,13 and appointed
as counsel for the petitioner Mr. Charles A. Horsky. 4
By its decision in Griffin v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court
vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois and remanded the
case with instructions to accord Griffin some adequate means of appeal,
by giving him a free transcript or otherwise.' 5 This decision was simple,
but the Justices' opinions were not. The five Justices who made up the
majority did not completely agree in theory. Four joined in the opinion
of Justice Black. Justice Frankfurter, in a separate opinion, concurred
in the result and in much of the reasoning, though with some elaboration
and with two important differences which we shall need to mention.
The four dissenters were also divided: Justices Burton and Minton
produced a short dissenting opinion in which Justices Reed and Harlan
joined. But Harlan also dissented in a longer opinion which elaborated
the reasons of the others and added one ground peculiar to himself.
PRIOR FEDERAL DECISIONS ON POVERTY AND
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
All four opinions in Griffin treat poverty as the central theme of the
case."' The issue may be put thus: Is it a deprivation of an individual's
1' The last section of that act, Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 38, § 832 (1955) authorizes such review
of any final judgment under that act.
12 351 U.S. at 13.
13 349 U.S. 937 (1955).
14 349 U.S. 949 (1955). Mr. Horsky is a distinguished member of the District of
Columbia Bar who has handled many important civil liberties cases. No discussion of the
Griffin case would be complete without a tribute to the magnificent brief of Messrs. Horsky,
Schafer and Wofford. It is outstanding in respect to its legal and factual research as well
as its presentation.
15 351 U.S. at 20. The Supreme Court of Illinois thereupon vacated its own judgment of
affirmance, i.e., its denial of Griffin's petition for writ of error under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act, and remanded the case to the Criminal Court of Cook County, with directions
to vacate its judgment in the proceedings thereunder. But the judgment of conviction was
not to be disturbed. Instead, the trial court was told to order the court reporter to
transcribe his notes and deliver a copy of the transcript without charge, so that Griffin
could proceed with his appeal (presumably by writ of error from the judgment of
conviction).
At the same time the Supreme Court of Illinois discussed amendments to its rules made
so as to order the furnishing, upon a showing of indigence, of a transcript at the state's
expense to any person sentenced to prison after April 23, 1956 (the date of the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Griffin) ; and also to any person so sentenced before that
date who should apply before March 1, 1957. People v. Griffin, 9 Ill. 2d 164, 137 N.E.2d
485 (1956). Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 110, § 101.65-1 (Supreme Court Rule 65-1) (1956).
16 This does not overlook the fact that Harlan's dissenting opinion urged that the issue
ought to have been avoided. 351 U.S. at 29-34.
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fundamental constitutional rights to so administer justice as to condi-
tion the assertion of basic legal rights on the ability to pay?
There is an astonishing want of authority on this question, a question
whose answer one familiar with our theory of government but not with
our case law might expect, to find at the very core of our system
of law. Ours is a nation dedicated to the proposition that all men are
created equal. This is not the jejune proposition that they are equal in
ability, but rather the proposition that they are equal in their claims that
the states and nation exist for each of them and for his welfare, not he
for any state or nation. Our Bill of Rights and fourteenth amendment
may be read in the light of this dedication. They dictate that a man
need not be nobleman, courtier, official, or Croesus, to get a "square
deal" from any government. Neither race nor creed nor sex nor low
estate should bar an American from the enjoyment of constitutional
privileges, immunities, due process, and equal protection of the laws.
If these be our principles, a mere lack of money should never be a
reason for the Law to treat any man differently or unfairly. Since mil-
lions of people17 lack sufficient money for their everyday needs, one
might expect the law books to be filled with decisions concerning the
constitutional effects of poverty. In fact, the opposite is true. Among
the thousands of cases dealing with constitutional rights, there seem to
be only a handful which touch this subject even tangentially. In the
digests and the indexes dealing with the fourteenth amendment there is
no topic nor heading such as "poverty." There are headings for "due
process," "equal protection" and "privileges and immunities," and many
subheads like "race," "creed," and "sex." But nothing for that "poverty"
which must in fact be the most ubiquitous of all the grounds of depriva-
tion and discrimination.
Early legal thinking equated poverty with viciousness. This made it
hardly a basis for a claim of constitutional right. Such an attitude, per-
haps derived from the medieval poor laws, was expressed in 1837 in an
opinion of the United States Supreme Court in City of New York v.
17 The tragic sweep of penury in a wealthy nation should need no documentation. But
a handful of figures may serve to make it vivid:
One family out of every five, or about eight million families, had incomes in 1954 of
$2,000 or less; one out of every eleven, of $1,000 or less. About two-thirds of the low-
income families are non-farm families. The heads of a majority of the low-income families
are employed wage-earners. About 4,800,000 persons live alone and have less than $1,000
of income a year.
These national data are borrowed from a Message of the Governor [of the State of
New York] Attacking the Problems of Low Incomes. Legislative Document No. 15 (1956).
They are based on Census Bureau studies.
[Vol. 43
THE GRIFFIN CASE
Miln,'8 which referred to "the moral pestilence of paupers" against
which a port was free to protect itself. This phrase was explicitly repu-
diated, however, by the same Court in Edwards v. California"0 a century
later. Justice Byrnes, for a majority of five, held that an old California
statute making it a misdemeanor to assist the entry into that state of a
known indigent violated the commerce clause. The Court said that what-
ever was the prevailing notion in 1837, "we do not think that it will be
now seriously contended that because a person is without employment
and without funds he constitutes a 'moral pestilence.' Poverty and
immorality are not synonymous.
2 0
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion, joined in by Justices Black and
Murphy, said that, whether human migrations were commerce or not,
the right to migrate was one springing from national citizenship and so
was protected by the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment. To hold otherwise, he said,2 would
introduce a caste system utterly incompatible with the spirit of our system
of government. It would permit those who were stigmatized by a State as
indigents, paupers, or vagabonds to be relegated to an inferior class of
citizenship. It would prevent a citizen because he was poor from seeking
new horizons in other States.
But it was Justice Jackson, in a separate concurring opinion, who
spoke most forcefully to the constitutional problem of poverty. Turning
away from the commerce clause, he relied entirely upon the rights of
national citizenship; and upon the hopes held out by the fourteenth
amendment and the remnants of those hopes still left after judicial
erosion. About poverty he said:22
Does "indigence" as defined by the application of the California statute
constitute a basis for restricting the freedom of a citizen, as crime or
contagion warrants its restriction? We should say now, and in no uncertain
terms, that a man's mere property status, without more, cannot be used by
a state to test, qualify, or limit his rights as a citizen of the United States.
"Indigence" in itself is neither a source of rights nor a basis for denying
them. The mere state of being without funds is a neutral fact-constitu-
tionally an irrelevance, like race, creed, or color. I agree with what I
understand to be the holding of the Court that cases which may indicate
the contrary are overruled .... (Emphasis added.)
I think California had no right to make the condition of Duncan's [the
migrant's] purse, with no evidence of any violation by him of any law or
social policy which caused it, the basis of excluding him or of punishing
one who extended him aid.
18 11 Pet. 102, 142 (1837). This decision was probably overruled by Henderson v.
City of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875).
19 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941).
20 Ibid.
21 Id. at 181.
22 Id. at 184-85.
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Thus Jackson emphasized the constitutional impact in Edwards v. Cali-
fornia, of poverty standing alone, unmixed with other elements such as
illiteracy, stupidity, or membership in an oppressed minority, which
often go with it.
A similar approach to the legal relevance of poverty is to be found in
Boykin v. Huff. Although the case was decided on other grounds, Justice
Rutledge, then Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, writing for a unanimous court, said:28
When the life or the liberty of the citizen is at stake on a serious criminal
charge, and appeals are given as a matter of right to those who are able to
pay for them, it may be doubted (though as to this we express no opinion)
whether they can be withheld from indigent persons solely on the ground
of their poverty or otherwise than so as to give them substantially equal
protection with more fortunate citizens. The right of appeal, though
statutory, is not insubstantial, and its statutory origin does not make it a
matter of such small consequence that it may be given or withheld
arbitrarily. (Footnote omitted.)
Only one other line of authority, so far as we can find, is directly
relevant to the constitutional effect of poverty, per se. This consists
of cases on the question whether, in a federal habeas corpus proceeding,
the objection that all state remedies have not been exhausted as required
for this proceeding, can be met by showing that the prisoner had no
money with which to pursue them. This may, at first, look like a purely
procedural question. But when it is remembered that federal habeas
corpus is often the last opportunity to vindicate fundamental constitu-
tional rights, and that it exists largely for that purpose, it seems clear
that to deny this remedy because poverty prevents meeting one of its
requirements, is to deprive a poor man of the right itself because he is
poor.
In Markuson v. Boucher,24 a petitioner asking a federal district court
for habeas corpus had alleged 5 that he could not afford to prosecute a
writ of error from the state court to the United States Supreme Court.26
The writ had issued; but, after a hearing, had been discharged. The
Court, by Justice McKenna, unanimously affirmed the discharge, but
without discussing petitioner's poverty.
A quarter century later, in 1925, in spite of the fact that the Court
had made no specific reference to poverty, this case was cited as au-
23 121 F.2d 865, 872 (1941).
24 175 U.S. 184 (1899).
25 Id. at 185.
26 Treated at that time as the final step in state remedies which had to be exhausted.
For a history of the oscillations of this rule, see Justice Reed's opinion in Darr v. Burford,
339 U.S. 200, 204-14 (1950).
[Vol. 43
THE GRIFFIN CASE
thority for a Supreme Court dictum that lack of means, even if proved,
would be no reason for relaxing the requirement of exhaustion of state
remedies. This dictum appeared in a unanimous opinion by Justice
Sutherland in United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler 7
The lower federal courts have sometimes interpreted these two Su-
preme Court cases as compelling the harsh rule that a man too poor to
pursue his state remedies fails, for that reason, to be eligible for federal
habeas corpus. In Kentucky, for example, in 1941 two cases held that
lack of funds, or any other personal reason for not taking full advantage
of the state's judicial machinery, did not excuse the prisoner from so
doing." Eight years later the second circuit took the same position in a
per curiam opinion in United States ex rel. Rheim v. Foster,9 relying on
the United States Supreme Court decision in United States ex rel.
Kennedy v. Tyler.
The next year in Willis v. Uteclzt3 the eighth circuit agreed, on the
then recently enacted section 2254 of the Judicial Code.31 The United
States District Court for the Northern District of California, in a 1956
case, appears to be the court which has most recently adopted this harsh
view.32
But more liberal voices seem now to prevail. These began by relying
on little authority but much common sense. As early as 1944, in Potter
v. Dowd" the seventh circuit held (by a divided court and over a strong
dissent) that a poor person with little education, who was unable to hire
counsel or to pay for a record for his state appeal, was eligible for federal
habeas corpus.
The sixth circuit, the very court which had affirmed the Kentucky
27 269 U.S. 13, 19 (1925).
28 Ex parte Sharpe, 36 F. Supp. 386, 388 (W.D. Ky. 1941) and Ex parte Stonefield, 36
F. Supp. 453, 456-57 (W.D. Ky. 1941). In each opinion Judge Miller relied upon the two
United States Supreme Court cases mentioned in the text; and also cited three circuit court
of appeals decisions. The only one of the three containing any mention of poverty is Ex
parte Novotny, 88 F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1937) which does not appear to turn on that point.
Judge Miller's decisions were affirmed by the sixth circuit: Sharpe, at 121 F.2d 448 (1941);
and Stonefield, at 124 F.2d 23 (1941). For the subsequent history of the Sharpe litigation,
through many phases but ones which did not directly involve the point of poverty, see 135
F.2d 974 (6th Cir. 1943) and 142 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1944).
29 175 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1949). The case was before Swan and Chase, Circuit Judges,
and J. Joseph Smith, District Judge. A motion for leave to file a petition for writ of
certiorari was denied, 338 U.S. 857, rehearing denied, 338 U.S. 888 (1949).
30 185 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 915 (1951).
31 62 Stat. 967 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1952). The Revisers' Note states that this new
section was intended to codify existing law. Its second paragraph says, "an applicant shall
not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within
the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise by any
available procedure, the question presented." Willis v. Utecht was followed, though with
evident reluctance, in Kubus v. Swenson, 120 F. Supp. 379, 380-81 (D. Minn. 1954).
32 Application of Meek, 138 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
33 146 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1944).
1957]
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District Court decisions ten years earlier, agreed with the seventh by
1951, when in Dolan v. Alvis, it said34 in a per curiam opinion,
If a prisoner is without funds or unable to obtain them, and may not pre-
sent his case on appeal to a state court or file a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus without prepayment of fees that he is unable to make, he would not
be precluded from filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal
court on the ground that he has not exhausted his remedies in the state
courts, for in such a case, he must be held to have exhausted such remedies.
Later in 1951 a suggestion of the liberal view appeared in an opinion
of the United States Supreme Court in Jennings v. Illinois.34a
In 1953 the second circuit, in United States ex rel. Martin v. Walker,3"
without mentioning its earlier Rheim opinion, affirmed per curiam a
Connecticut district court's decision below, and adopted its opinion. The
opinion thus adopted by the second circuit has a strangely ambivalent
effect on our question. The district court had accepted jurisdiction after
the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors had refused to entertain an
appeal from petitioner's conviction, because of the lack of a printed
record which he could not afford. Thus the district court found poverty a
sufficient ground to excuse failure to exhaust Connecticut remedies.
Nevertheless it found the same circumstances an insufficient ground for
the prisoner's claim of deprivation of constitutional right. (The Griffin
case had not yet been decided; and the district court's opinion on this
point reads like the dissenting opinions in Griffin.)
Whatever the true significance of the Martin case, the second circuit
has in one case seemed to swing completely into line with the recent
majority trend, relying in part on Martin for doing so. In United States
ex rel. Embree v. Cummings, Judge Lumbard, for a unanimous court,
said:
34 186 F.2d 586, 587 (6th Cir. 1951). Here (as in United States ex rel. Rheim v. Foster
holding the opposite, see note 29 supra) certiorari was denied, 342 U.S. 906 (1952). Dolan
v. Alvis was followed in the Sixth Circuit by Rhea v. Edwards, 136 F. Supp. 671, 676
(M.D. Tenn. 1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1956) for the reasons stated in the opinion
in the court below.
34a 342 U.S. 104, 109-11 (1951).
35 203 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1953), affirming 111 F. Supp. 455 (D. Conn. 1952) on the lower
court's opinion and the authority of Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Darr v. Burford,
339 U.S. 200 (1950); and Connecticut v. Reddick, 139 Conn. 398, 94 A.2d 613 (1953).
The court consisted of Circuit Judges A. Hand, Chase and Clark. The cases cited fall
short of making clear the points on which the second circuit intended to differ with the
Connecticut district judge or to supplement his opinion.
36 233 F.2d 188, 189 (2d Cir. 1956). The court was composed of Circuit Judges Lumbard,
Medina and Waterman, none of whom had sat in the Martin case; see note 35 supra.
On the same day on which the Cummings case was decided, similar decisions were made by
the same court in United States ex rel. St. John v. Cummings, 233 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1956)
and United States ex rel. Rhyce v. Cummings, 233 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1956). The first
sentence of this quotation from Judge Lumbard's opinion was quoted with approval in
Matter of Sears, 152 F. Supp. 55, 58 (S.D. Cal. 1957), although on the facts habeas corpus
was denied.
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Where the only state remedies are inaccessible to a prisoner because of
his poverty, his failure to pursue those remedies does not bar him from
applying to the federal courts for relief. The Supreme Court suggested
as much in Jennings v. State of Illinois, 1951, 342 U.S. 104, 109-11 ....
where it pointed out that federal habeas corpus may be available where
the petitioner is barred from appealing his conviction by his inability to
pay the costs required by state law. And we have so held in United States
ex rel. Martin v. Walker, 2 Cir., 1953, 203 F.2d 563, affirming D.C.D.
Conn. 1952, 111 F. Supp. 455. Courts in other circuits have similarly held
that if state remedies are not available to an indigent prisoner he may
proceed in the federal court. Robbins v. Green, 1 Cir., 1954, 218 F.2d 192;
Dolan v. Alvis, 6 Cir., 1951, 186 F.2d 586, certiorari denied 1952, 342 U.S.
906 .... Contra: Willis v. Utecht, 8 Cir., 1950, 185 F.2d 210, certiorari
denied 1951, 340 U.S. 915 ....
But more recent decisions make it doubtful how far this court has
really gone. 3
7
As indicated by Judge Lumbard, above, the first circuit had also
reached the same position two years earlier, in Robbins v. Green."7a
Thus the first, sixth, and seventh circuits agree; the second is doubt-
ful; the eighth is opposed. But it is to be noted that all these decisions are
couched in terms of the requirements for federal habeas corpus to inter-
fere in state proceedings, and not in terms of the constitutional law of
the fourteenth amendment.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE AND RULE OF THE GRIFFIN DECISION
The Griffin opinions announce constitutional policy on a question
which the Supreme Court has never squarely faced before. They say
clearly, and for the first time, that a state may not condition a person's
assertion of basic legal rights on financial ability.
We are fortunate to have had such an important issue faced so de-
cisively. This good fortune springs both from the "clean" character of
the record on appeal and from the plain speaking of the majority and
minority opinions.
3'7 United States ex rel. Jordan v. Martin, 238 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1956), a per curiam
decision in which judge Lumbard himself participated, explicitly denied that the Rheim
case had been overruled by a "group of recent cases . . . still before this court undecided."
The reference is bewildering, since the Embree group of cases which seemed to overrule
Rheim seemed to have been completely decided six months before. We know of no other
cases which could have overruled Rheim. See United States ex rel. Kozicky v. Fay, 148
F. Supp. 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Possibly the Jordan decision was influenced by the facts
that a New York prisoner was involved and that in New York appeals in forma pauperis
exist; whereas in Connecticut, from which the Embree cases came, no such procedure
exists. People ex rel. Milo v. Jackson, 148 F. Supp. 757 (N.D.N.Y. 1957). Both these
recent district court cases followed Rheim and Jordan and, like them, were also cases
coming from New York. If this should be the difference between Embree and Rheim it
suggests a similarity between the group of cases from New York and the federal-convict
Johnson case to be discussed below, pp. 21-22.
37a 218 F.2d 192, 195-96 (1st Cir. 1954).
1957]
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The record presented the issue of poverty in complete isolation, as if
in the test tube of a chemical laboratory. It was uncontaminated by
such factors as the ignorance or illiteracy of the man or the hostility of
the crowd; factors which have accompanied poverty in so many cases, the
Scottsboro cases 38 for example. Griffin might have been the popular idol
of the crowd; he might have been a learned doctor of jurisprudence; it
would not have mattered. All that mattered was his lack of money.
In deciding that Griffin must have his appeal, therefore, on the clear
and simple record before it, the Court had to lay down the clear and
simple, but momentous, rule that poverty alone cannot bar the right to
appeal from a conviction for a serious crime.
THE REASONING OF THE COURT
The four Justices for whom Black spoke thought that Illinois had
denied both due process and equal protection. The four dissenters
thought that it had denied neither. Frankfurter's concurring opinion,
which of course was crucial, said that Illinois had denied equal protec-
tion. He may have meant that, by denying equal protection in this kind
of case, it had denied due process as well. We think he did. But others
doubt or disagree; 9 and there is room for such doubt.
38 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 50-52 (1932).
39 Justice Walter V. Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois, writing for his court in
People v. Griffin on its remand, said that Illinois had erred in believing that no federal
constitutional question was involved. He said that equal protection had been violated
and perhaps due process. 9 Ill. 2d 164, 137 N.E.2d 485 (1956). But Judge Schaefer thinks
that cases of this sort are more correctly classed as equal-protection cases than as due-
process cases. He said in "Federalism and State Criminal Procedure," 70 Harv. L. Rev.
1, 10 (1956) that the United States Supreme Court had based its decision of the Griffin
case "largely, if not entirely, upon the equal protection clause." In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942), the Supreme Court had said that due process did not command a state to
furnish counsel to indigent defendants in all non-capital cases, but only in cases of hardship.
Justice Roberts, writing therein for the court had distinguished earlier cases on the ground
that in them state statutes had required the appointment of counsel. "As a basis of distinc-
tion under the due process clause," Judge Schaefer remarked, "the reference to state statutes
is mysterious. It has meaning, it seems to me, only in terms of equal protection of the law."
Professor Charles Fairman agrees that the basis of Frankfurter's Griffin opinion is equal
protection. In the same number of the Harvard Law Review as that in which Judge
Schaefer's article appears, in "The Supreme Court 1955 Term" he said (at p. 126) "Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, . . . agreed only that the equal protection clause was violated."
He repeated this opinion (at p. 128), saying that Frankfurter and the four dissenters
agreed that there was no violation of due process. He spoke with approval of this opinion,
although he noted that it "overlooks the doctrine that a state may not attach arbitrary
conditions to the grant of a privilege."
Most law review commentators consider that the Griffin decision was based both on
due process and on equal protection. 34 Texas L. Rev. 1083 (1956); 17 Ohio St. L.J.
553 (1956); 30 Temp. L.Q. 61 (1956); 10 Vand. L. Rev. 141 (1956); 55 Mich. L. Rev.
413 (1957).
Mr. Justice McCarthy, in People v. Jackson, 2 Misc. 2d 521, 152 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Herkimer
County Ct. 1956), in holding that the Griffin Case required the county to pay for a
transcript, put its holding on both due process and equal protection without distinction.
This decision was disapproved in People v. Brown, - App. Div. -, 158 N.Y.S.2d 1003
(4th Dep't 1957).
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Black said that,
our own constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection both
call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious discrimina-
tions between persons and different groups of persons. Both equal protec-
tion and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial
system-all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned,
"stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court.''39a
He drove this home with the illustrative point that to require the pay-
ment of court costs before allowing a not guilty plea, or before allowing
a defense, would be patently unconstitutional.
Thus four Justices considered equality of treatment and the absence
of arbitrary discrimination to be a part of due process as surely as a
part of equal protection. If there could be doubt of this, Black's next
point would dispel it. He conceded-perhaps too readily-that appellate
review of criminal convictions is not one of the minimum guaranties of
decency exacted by due process.40 Discrimination is a part of denial of
due process, just as it is a part of denial of equal protection. Denial to
all equally of a privilege which due process does not in absolute terms
exact, may come to violate due process if the denial is arbitrarily applied
to some persons but not to others.41 And yet arbitrary discrimination is
the traditional way of violating the equal protection clause. Thus, the
two concepts overlap.4
This point reached, we may now suggest that Frankfurter's concurring
opinion did not really differ on the theory of decision. He started his
opinion by agreeing, most emphatically, with Black that due process does
-9a 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
40 He cites McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894), decided soon after the
first procedures for review of criminal cases had been established in our federal courts, and
only five years after such review was authorized there for serious crimes. See United States
v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 319-22 (1892); 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1956). We suggest that
McKane v. Durston might be decided differently today. In the same opinion in which
Black asserts that appeal is no part of due process, he cites a note in 42 Harv. L. Rev.
566 (1929) to show that a substantial proportion of criminal convictions are reversed on
appeal. 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 n.14. He levels the argument at the unfairness and inequality of
denying review to the poor. He seems to ignore its showing of the fundamental unfair-
ness of denying review to all-rich and poor alike. We submit that Frankfurter makes a
similar mistake, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21, in taking a categorical position that due process,
while the "least frozen concept of our law," has yet not thawed enough to feel the
fundamental, shocking unfairness which would result today from a complete denial of
review of criminal judgments.
41 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). See Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201-02
(1948); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 327 (1915). The United States Supreme Court
has said ". . . the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The 'equal protection of the law'
is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than 'due process of law,' and there-
fore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court
has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process ....
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (Warren, Ch. J. for a unanimous Court).
42 See Wilson, "The Merging Concepts of Liberty and Equality," 12 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
182 (1954).
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not exact any right to appeal from a conviction for crime. 43 Nor is equal
protection violated, he continued, by classification per se. Nothing pro-
hibits a classification which allows appeals from death sentences but not
from lesser sentences. If Illinois allowed no appeal either to the pauper
or to the millionaire, unless sentenced to death, there would be no viola-
tion of equal protection or due process. Not of equal protection, because
this classification is reasonable; not of due process, as we have seen,
because no appeal at all need be allowed.
Then came a passage which, in the light of this introduction, seems
to us to show that Frankfurter, not less than the other four Justices who
decided the Griffin case with him, thought that Illinois had violated due
process as well as equal protection:
But neither the fact that a State may deny the right of appeal altogether
nor the right of a State to make an appropriate classification, based on
differences in crimes and their punishment, nor the right of a State to lay
down conditions it deems appropriate for criminal appeals, sanctions
differentiations by a State that have no relation to a rational policy of
criminal appeal or authorizes the imposition of conditions that offend the
deepest presuppositions of our society. Surely it would not need argument
to conclude that a State could not, within its wide scope of discretion in
these matters, allow an appeal for persons convicted of crimes punishable
by imprisonment of a year or more, only on payment of a fee of $500. 44
It will be noted that this passage included a statement that: ".... the
fact that a State may deny the right of appeal altogether ... [does not
authorize] the imposition of conditions that offend the deepest presup-
positions of our society." This is the language of due process, which
Frankfurter wisely rolls together, inextricably, with language of equal
protection. We submit that Frankfurter's view is not in disagreement
with Black's-that it is only an elaboration of it.
It is true, of course, that Frankfurter was thinking in terms which
emphasized the equal protection facet of the rights at bar. He closed
this part of his argument, in fact, with words which showed this; he
said that Illinois may find effective means within the existing resources
of its law "of according to petitioners effective satisfaction of this consti-
tutional right not to be denied the equal protection of the laws."45 And
in 1951, in Jennings v. Illinois,46 Frankfurter had remarked in a dissent-
ing opinion that refusal of a stenographic transcript might raise a ques-
tion under "the Fourteenth Amendment, and more particularly of its
Equal Protection clause.")47
43 351 U.S. at 20-21.
44 Id. at 21-22.
45 Id. at 25.
46 342 U.S. 104 (1951).
47 Id. at 114.
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The issue is one of logomachy.
We have indulged, nevertheless, in this textual consideration of Frank-
furter's views because it is a matter of great moment whether he reads
the due process clause more narrowly than do the rest of the majority 8
DISSENT
The objections to the holding were impressive. They persuaded four
Justices, and there is no clear legal demonstration which can show why
they did not prevail. One or more may prevail in the future, though it
may be hoped that this will be in cases dealing with less fundamental
liberties. The key to the Griffin decision is not in the reasons voiced. It
was in the conviction felt, by five of nine, that it was an indecency, in a
nation of free people, to bar a poverty stricken man from a chance to
show that his government had convicted the innocent. The dissenters'
reasons must be looked at, realistically, not as bad reasons but as reasons
not good enough to prevail.
Justices Burton and Minton, on behalf of all four dissenters, argued,
first, that as giving no appeal would admittedly be due process, giving
appeals on differing terms can hardly deny due process.49 To prescribe
special privileges for a defendant charged with a capital offense is tradi-
tional and reasonable, and does not violate equal protection. In this,
Burton and Minton attacked a straw man; for the majority do not
deny it.50
But the dissenters came to grips with the real issue when they said:
... certainly Illinois does not deny equal protection to convicted defend-
ants when the terms of the appeal are open to all, although some may
not be able to avail themselves of the full appeal because of their poverty.
Illinois is not bound to make the defendants economically equal before
its bar of justice.51
Justice Harlan concurred with the Burton-Minton opinion, but added
three points. The first complained of the failure of the record to present
with sufficient clarity and definiteness the broad constitutional question
decided."
48 For an example of an opinion which raises the legal consequences of the question
whether Griffin involved equal protection as well as due process see District judge Chesnut
in United States v. Sanders, 142 F. Supp. 638, 645 (D. Md. 1956).
40 351 U.S. at 27. See id. at 19 and Black's n.16 for his answer and an eloquent quota-
tion from Jeffries v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. 573, 576, 132 Pac. 823, 825 (1913).
50 Id. at 27-28. The majority placed no reliance upon the special provisions by Illinois
for poor persons sentenced to death. Black ignored it. Frankfurter mentioned it, id. at 21,
but merely as a case in which, as Burton and Minton say, differentiation is proper.
51 Id. at 28.
52 justice Harlan would have remanded to the Illinois courts so as to learn the precise
nature of the claim before deciding. The record showed simply that Griffin needed a
transcript. Harlan was left in doubt whether this need was a matter of law or a matter of
fact. If of law, the claim was in error because of the possibility, recognized by Illinois
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Secondly, Harlan dealt with equal protection. He elaborated upon the
ideas expressed in the sentences we have quoted from the Burton-Minton
opinion. He added that the majority would hold Illinois constitutionally
required to discriminate affirmatively in favor of the poor by giving them
free what it makes the affluent buy. Elsewhere, the charging of a fee for
a privilege is not a constitutional wrong. Tuition charges are allowed at
a state university, although excluding "indigents" by name would not be.
If in felony cases, what of misdemeanors? If in criminal cases, what
of civil cases? The gravity of the consequences, Harlan concluded, can
not be the test in an equal protection case. Either the classification is
reasonable or it is not. But the majority turns to a novel question: the
reasonableness of Illinois' failure to remove natural difficulties. This,
however, is the language of due process; it is a consideration out of place
in equal protection."
Coming at last to due process, Harlan urged that Illinois had acted
beyond the call of constitutional duty. Illinois had given review 130
years ago; it had given official court reporters seventy years ago; thirty
years ago it had given free transcripts to paupers sentenced to death;
and four years ago, to all paupers claiming constitutional errors in their
convictions. If it had never set out upon this road, the majority of the
Court could find nothing unconstitutional in its course. How could this
long road of progress lead to a denial of due process of law?
cases, of using a narrative or "bystander's bill" of exceptions. If of fact, nothing is alleged
but poverty; and before deciding, the Court should know "the circumstances underly-
ing the conclusory allegation of 'need.'" The Court ought not to take judicial notice, as it
apparently does, of the inadequacy of methods of appeal alternative to that based on a
transcript. The decision is too important; it will affect the law of at least nineteen states
which do not provide free transcripts in these cases; it will create "a host of problems."
But Harlan noted that he alone took this view. 351 U.S. at 29-33. The other eight justices
were influenced, as indicated by Black's opinion, by the fact that counsel for Illinois had
said, in oral argument, "There isn't any way that an Illinois convicted person in a non-
capital case can obtain a bill of exceptions without paying for it." Id. at 13-14 n.4; see
also nn.2, 3. Frankfurter remarked that ". . . it would savor of disrespect to the Supreme
Court of Illinois for us to find an implication in its unqualified rejection of the claims of
the petitioners that an effective review other than by bill of exceptions [which they could
not afford] could be had in the present situation." Id. at 25; see also 22, 24-25. Study of
the briefs and record in the Griffin case suggests another question which the dissenters
might have raised, but did not: might not the order of the Supreme Court of Illinois,
finding no constitutional question involved in the writ of error, have meant that it found
no constitutional question raised by "the proceedings which resulted in [Griffin's] con-
viction" within the meaning of those words of the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act?
If so, the decision was on a point of state law, so that no federal question was involved;
in that case some other method of raising Griffin's constitutional claim would have had to
be devised. See Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104, 111-12, 115-16 (1951); Young v. Ragen,
337 U.S. 235, 236-37 (1949). But no one raised this difficulty, not even the Supreme Court
of Illinois after remand. Perhaps no one had quite the heart to suggest that after the many
failures by Illinois to provide required protection for federal constitutional rights, there
was still a "hole" in its Post-Conviction Hearing Act. See, for some of the history of the
failures, "Post-Trial Remedies: the Illinois Merry-Go-Round Breaks Down," 46 Ill. L. Rev.
900 (1952).
53 351 U.S. at 34-36.
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There is no such constitutional right to an appeal as there is to a trial.
"Rather the constitutional right under the due process clause is simply
the right not to be denied an appeal for arbitrary or capricious reasons. 54
Economy may be unenlightened, but no one could call it arbitrary.
States have generally provided for criminal appeals before they have
provided for appeals in forma pauperis. It has never been suggested that
this was unconstitutional. Nor does the unfairness by itself deny due
process. Making an indigent pay for a transcript if he wants one is not
"shocking to the universal sense of justice." 55
Harlan's effort to draw a sharp line in criminal procedure, between
due process and equal protection, is a singularly sterile one. The two
concepts differ more in emphasis than in content.56 Due process empha-
sizes fundamental unfairness; equal protection stresses comparison with
other persons whom the state may treat better.
But equal protection is heavily affected by fundamental unfairness.
The conventional limitations-that the discrimination must, to offend,
be either intentionally discriminatory in purpose or else arbitrary in
effect 5 ---do not apply where the discrimination results in something that
shocks the fundamental sense of justice."8
Due process, on the other hand, can not be considered intelligently
other than by comparisons: comparisons with what is customary
and acceptable, in the state and elsewhere; comparisons, conscious or
subconscious, with what the judge feels would be fair treatment of him-
self were he wrongfully accused, ignorant, poor and friendless; and com-
parisons with a happy ideal thought of by the judge as embodying the
perfect administration of justice.
In addition to their differences over the technical meaning of the
fourteenth amendment, the majority and minority of the Court differed,
in reality, upon a much more basic question, involving the nature of our
legal institutions and their role in a democratic state.
The majority must have supported Griffin's claim because they thought
that the state owes it to its citizens to provide them with practical
means for securing justice under the constitution. Without these means,
such justice is sheer theory. Only with them can it become actual, applied
justice. On the other hand, the minority must have denied Griffin's claim
because they thought that the state owes its citizens no more than to
54 Id. at 37.
55 Quoted from Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 459, 462 (1942).
56 See note 41 supra quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
57 Fairman, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 83, 126 (1956).
58 See 55 Mfich. L. Rev. 413, 416-18, 422 (1957).
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make justice available to them. These major premises must have been
what led the majority to its particular holding that Illinois was required
to provide a free transcript or other means for Griffin's appeal; and the
minority to its particular opinion that Illinois did enough by making an
appeal available to him if he could afford it. The majority thought, in
other words, that the state had a constitutional duty to overcome the
effect of poverty on the availability of appeal. The minority thought not.
The minority's view might be illustrated in this way: As a poor man,
Griffin was doubtless deprived of many things besides his appeal; proper
medical care, for instance. Would anyone argue that Illinois owes a
constitutional duty to provide medical care to the poor? If not, how
can anyone argue that it owes a constitutional duty to provide a kind
of legal care?
The majority does not answer this argument in terms; but an answer
is implicit in the position they take, viz., basic legal services are not of
the same order, in our theory of government, as basic medical services.
The provision of applied justice is an essential function of the state even
under the most conservative political theory. It is of the essence of
citizenship that a person have access to the state's legal institutions.
Without this he is without full citizenship; he is a helpless victim of the
government's monopoly of force. That this rather theoretical-sounding
statement may in actual fact be true far too often, makes it very urgent,
in human terms, to strive against it.
We cannot conceive of a man as truly a citizen if he is too poor to have
access to the courts. We can, however, conceive of him as truly a citizen
if he is too poor to receive adequate medical care.
A state which provides its citizens with medical care we term a wel-
fare state. It has extended the role of government to provide for the
social welfare of its people. And if we dislike welfare states, we may
repeat the adage that "that government is best which governs least."
But a state which does no more than to provide all its citizens with
applied justice is not extending the role of government to novel fields
but rather only giving all men that which is the most basic function of
government, the provision of legal process.
These considerations show a sound constitutional basis for the ma-
jority's position in Griffin-a position which may be epitomized in
Black's phrase:
Surely no one would contend that either a State or the Federal Govern-
ment could constitutionally provide that defendants unable to pay court
costs in advance should be denied the right to plead not guilty or to
defend themselves in court.59
59 351 U.S. at 17.
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There would be no similar constitutional bar to a state's requiring pay-
ment for medical services rendered, or to its charging tuition at a state
university. Contrary to Harlan's suggestion, 60 there is no contradiction
in holding it unconstitutional to require money from the poor for legal
services while holding it constitutional to require money from them for
educational or medical services. These last are services of a different
order. Equal access to the processes of law is embedded in our constitu-
tion and in every democratic constitution, as a necessary element in the
relationship between the citizen and his government.
Of course the minority does not, in terms, deny the unique constitu-
tional character of a state's duty to give applied justice. Harlan com-
plains against a state's being required to discriminate in favor of the
rich. 1 He concedes that this discrimination may be reasonable; but
makes requiring it sound verbally absurd by bringing the point into the
part of his opinion devoted to equal protection of the laws. Yet neither
he nor the other dissenting Justices directly challenge Frankfurter's
assertion that a state could not exact $500 for an appeal.62 The dissenters
thus do not challenge the constitutional need for applied justice; but
they fail in imaginativeness when it comes to realizing what this need
implies in the actual workings of the courtroom.
THE DECISION'S EFFECT ON CHARGES FOR
TRANSCRIPTS AND-APPEAL COSTS, ETC.
The direct and immediate effect of the decision, to the extent that it
is enforced, will be that a state which allows criminal appeals only at
some cost must make some similar relief available to a convict who
shows poverty. The state must bring within the convict's financial reach,
any required transcript (or equivalent); and pay for him, or waive,
appeal bond premium, filing fees for appeal, and other such expenses.
The required costs of preparing record and briefs might seem also to be
included; without these, there could in many cases be no appeal at all,
before April 1956. At least since April 195663 the fourteenth amend-
ment requires that the state see that the convict is not barred from
court review solely by his own economic condition.
On the narrow application of the Griffin case, a mixed reception is
already apparent. (1) The Supreme Court of Illinois, as we have seen,
has given the decision full and cordial effect, by prompt amendment of
60 Id. at 35.
61 Id. at 34-35.
62 Id. at 22.
63 The question of the retroactive effect of the Griffin case raised by Frankfurter's
concurring opinion will be briefly touched below.
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its rules." (2) In June of 1956 the Supreme Court of Oregon reached a
similar result in Barber v. Gladden,65 though more grudgingly. It held
that because of Griffin the requirement of an appeal bond and fees for
filing an appeal in that court must be waived. The judges of that court
were "forced, not by [their] own reasoning, but by the necessary impli-
cations" of Griffin, 6 to that conclusion; they could not "in good con-
science be parties to judicial nullification or 'interposition' which could
result in forty-nine purported authorities on constitutional issues instead
of one." 67 They expressed the thought that the United States Supreme
Court would "not carry its ruling to such coldly logical extreme as
would disrupt the accepted judicial procedures of the 48 states."6 The
fact that the Barber case was a civil action for habeas corpus rather
than a criminal appeal was of no moment; if anything, since habeas
corpus was the method for raising constitutional questions, the case was a
stronger case even than the Griffin case.
(3) The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has also taken cognizance of
Griffin. In Meredith v. Kentucky, 9 decided in December of 1956, the
court cited it in connection with a comment that a "bystander's bill" was
"not an entirely desirable way of presenting the record in an appeal
from conviction of a capital offense."7 But nobody had asked the
stenographer to take full stenographic notes; and the accused had had
counsel at the trial. Clearly nothing could be done.
(4) The Attorney General of Kansas, in a letter of July 19, 1956,
published by the University of Kansas Law Review,71 has suggested that
Griffin requires delivery of a free transcript to the convict if needed for
a direct appeal, but only if that appeal is not late for any reason; Griffin
does not apply to habeas corpus proceedings. There is no statutory au-
thority in Kansas for doing what the United States Supreme Court says
must be done. Until legislation comes, the county wherein the trial occurs
must probably bear the cost. Certainly not the Office of the Attorney
General.
(5) But New York is the state, thus far, where the most frequent
notice of the Griffin case appears to have been taken by the judges. Its
decisions are worthy of attention because they suggest some more of
the probable outlines of the application of the doctrine of the Griffin case.
64 See note 15 supra.
65 - Ore. - (1956), 298 P.2d 986.
66 Id. at 990.
67 Id. at 989.
68 Id. at 990.
69 - Ky. - (1956), 296 S.W.2d 705.
70 Id. at 707.
71 5 Kan. L. Rev. 132 (1956).
[Vol. 43
THE GRIFFIN CASE
New York is one of the many states which, according to the United
States Supreme Court, had already "provided aid for convicted defend-
ants who have a right to appeal and need a transcript but are unable to
pay for it." For this, Black's opinion cited Section 456 of the New York
Code of Criminal Procedure.7' That section provides that upon convic-
tion for an indictable crime and upon service of a notice of appeal there-
from, the stenographer must transcribe the minutes of the trial at the
county's expense and deliver a certified copy to the clerk of the court
where the conviction was obtained. But, except in capital cases, New
York statutes do not provide for the giving of a free copy of this tran-
script to the convict or his attorney.73 Nevertheless, two enthusiastic
county judges, shortly after the Griffin decision, read it as requiring that
a free copy be thus furnished. People v. Jackson ordered that done in
Herkimer County Court, in June 1956; 1 People v. Strong did the same
in Kings County, in September of the same year.75
But the appellate division for the fourth department, which includes
Herkimer County, was quick, in People v. Brown,76 to repudiate People
v. Jackson. It granted a motion to appeal on the original record and
on handwritten briefs; but it denied the part of the motion which sought
an order that the court furnish a transcript of the trial minutes gratis,
saying:
Neither this Court nor the Court of original jurisdiction has power to
furnish to a defendant, gratis, a transcript of the minutes of trial, after
trial, except in cases where the judgment is of death or of life imprison-
ment following a recommendation of a jury pursuant to section 1045-a
of the Penal Law . . . [citing the authorities mentioned in our footnote
73 above] Any holding to the contrary, as in People v. Jackson ... we
do not approve.
And three days before this fourth department decision, Judge
Barshay had reversed his own decision, on reargument, in People v.
72 351 U.S. at 19 and n.15.
73 N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 308, 48S. People v. Raymondi, 180 Misc. 973, 43 N.Y.S.2d
217 (Kings County Ct. 1943) (Liebowitz, J.).
74 2 Misc. 2d 521, 152 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Herkimer County Ct. 1956) (McCarthy, J.).
Professor McKay, in 31 N.Y.U.L. Rev. at 1366-67 (1956), says of this decision, "The first
case to bring New York practice into conformity with [the Griffin case] followed within
less than two months in People v. Jackson."
75 159 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1956) (Barshay, J.). In People v. Lumpkin, 158 N.Y.S.2d 610
(N.Y. County Ct. Gen. Sess. 1956), Judge Capozzoli had implied that he would read the
Griffin case as requiring the furnishing of a free copy of a transcript to the convict. But
he denied the motion for that relief because no actual need for these minutes was shown
by the motion. An appeal had been taken already and had been dismissed. He noted that
New York State provides for an appeal by an indigent defendant as a poor person, a course
not open to Griffin in Illinois.
76 3 App. Div. 2d 696, 158 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (4th Dep't 1957). See also People v. Moylan,
162 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Bronx County Ct. 1956), and People v. Cadogan, 163 N.Y.S.2d 190
(Queens County Ct. 1956).
1957]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
Strong. This he did on the ground that the appellate division for the
second department, having full knowledge of the Griffin case, had
decided otherwise in People v. Strong itself, on a motion to it for leave to
appeal as a poor person and for a free copy of the trial minutes."
These decisions are not very articulate, but they seem to emphasize
the indefiniteness of the mandate which was given by the United States
Supreme Court to the State of Illinois. Both Black and Frankfurter were
careful to stress the fact that their Court was not ordering the giving of
minutes but the giving of real review. 78 In the same month in which
People v. Brown and People v. Strong (II) were decided, the New York
Court of Appeals decided a case which, without mentioning Griffin, gives
support to our view that it is enough for New York State to make the
minutes available in a public office without handing a free copy to the
convict or his counsel-but with the crucial proviso that the circum-
stances of the particular case be such that the convict or his counsel can
make effective use of the public copy. This case is People v. Kalan.79
In a per curiam opinion the court said, of a unanimous affirmance by the
second department of a conviction for larceny,
When this appellant filed his appeal, as of right, in the court below it
was apparent that he was penniless, and unable to employ counsel or to
pay for a transcript of the trial minutes; that he was in prison and
physically unable to inspect the transcript of the minutes which had been
filed in the Clerk's office of Queens County pursuant to section 456 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. While we do not decide that failure to
appoint counsel will always constitute a deprivation of constitutional rights,
we nonetheless hold that, under the circumstances of this case, refusal to
assign counsel upon defendant's request prevented an effective use of the
right to appeal in violation of the constitutional guarantees of due process
and equal protection. N.Y. Const. art. I, §§ 6, 11.
The judgment should be reversed and the appeal remitted to the Ap-
pellate Division for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Note that the constitutional rights mentioned were those of due process
and equal protection under the provisions of the New York State Consti-
tution alone. The court evidently thought it unnecessary to reach the
federal question or the Griffin case.
These decisions teach that the goal of adequate opportunity for review,
not in theory but in actuality, may be reached by many valid routes. The
filing of a copy of the needed transcript, without charge to the convict,
77 People v. Strong, 159 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1957). The decision of the second department
to which judge Barshay refers does not seem to have been reported.
78 351 U.S. at 20 and 25, respectively. For a North Dakota application of this point see
State v. Moore, - N.D. -, 82 N.W.2d 217 (1957).
79 2 N.Y.2d 278, 140 N.E.2d 357, 159 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1957).
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in a public office,80 may under favorable circumstances be one such route;
it will not be such a route if the circumstances make the aid thus
tendered illusory.
(6) One other type of case, to which People v. Kalan points, is a type
somewhat similar to those cases discussed above, which deal with ex-
haustion of state remedies as a requirement for federal habeas corpus.
This is the type of case involving a federal convict who seeks to appeal to
a federal court of appeals. Poverty is often one of his difficulties. But the
federal statutes and rules provide aid on the condition that he convince
the trial judge that he has good grounds for his appeal. Section 1915
of Title 28 of the United States Code authorizes a permission to appeal
in forma pauperis. If this is granted, section 753(f) authorizes a free
transcript. But section 1915 (a) provides that "an appeal may not be
taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not
taken in good faith."
We did not, in our survey of the judicial treatment of poverty before
Griffin, discuss the multitude of cases which have arisen under this
section. They do not quite present the "test tube" situation wherein a
convict is prevented from appealing, or seriously handicapped in appeal-
ing, by poverty unmixed with any other element. Here the element of
the merits of the appeal intrudes. In these cases the courts denying
appeals have failed to notice the discrimination against the poor, result-
ing from letting the rich appeal as a matter of course while screening
the appeals of the poor for "good faith."
The late Judge Jerome Frank, always an eloquent champion of the
impoverished litigant, 81 wrote an eloquent dissent in United States v.
Johnson in the second circuit.8 The defendant, Johnson, convicted and
sentenced in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of New
York, gave notice of appeal and simultaneously petitioned the trial court
for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, his poverty being undenied. The
trial judge refused the petition, for lack of merit, saying in the words
of the statute that the appeal was "not taken in good faith." The de-
80 That stenographic minutes of a trial filed with the clerk of court upon the service
of a notice of appeal pursuant to Code Crim. Proc. § 456 are public records, was stated in
New York Post Corp. v. Leibowitz, 286 App. Div. 760, 147 N.Y.S.2d 782 (2d Dep't 1955),
motion for leave to appeal granted, 2 N.Y.2d 705 (1956). The appellate division cited
N.Y. Public Officers Law § 66; this, among other things, requires the clerk of court in such
a case to make certified copies available, for proper fees.
81 Frank, Courts on Trial 94-99 (1949); Frank, "White Collar Justice," Sat. Eve. Post,
July 17, 1943, p. 27; Frank, "Administration of Criminal Justice," 15 F.R.D. 95, 100-01
(1953).
82 238 F.2d 565, 567 (2d Cir. 1956). See also United States v. Farley, 238 F.2d 575
(2d Cir. 1956) and United States v. Branch, 238 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1956) decided the
same day by the same court; and United States v. Farley, 242 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1957);
Gershon v. United States, 243 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1957).
1957]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
fendant then petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for
the relief denied below. Judge Hincks, for the majority, denied the
motion on the ground that the Griffin case "was not addressed to the prob-
lems involved in frivolous appeals."8' 3
Frank dissented. He considered that while the Griffin case involved
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, it was equally ap-
plicable to the federal system since a due process clause appears in the
fifth amendment also. Therefore the Griffin case now bans discrimina-
tion against a would-be appellant in the federal courts because of his
poverty. Requiring a poor man to get a certificate of merit is in itself a
discrimination, unless the poor man is given an appeal on the merits
from a denial of the certificate. It must be remembered that a judge who
has presided at a trial is likely to think that it was conducted impeccably.
The upper court cannot usually decide effectively whether the denial of
a certificate was arbitrary, unless a transcript can be presented; with-
out that, it cannot really decide whether the appeal is frivolous. Depriva-
tion of this chance of reversal is punishment-of anyone erroneously con-
victed--"for the crime of poverty."
Griffin is a splendid step, Judge Frank said; but it will need a great
deal of implementing. A rich nation should not boggle at the cost and
effort required-"shudder away from" it, in Frank's vivid words-to
furnish complete justice. England and the Scandinavian countries do it,
often to an extent undreamed of here. We are false to our ideals in not
doing it. Legislation would be needed for a thoroughgoing change; but
to a large degree already "the Statutes and the precedents ... authorize
us to do justice .... " So dissented Judge Frank in one of his last
opinions.
In Johnson v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court, in a
per curiam opinion, vacated the second circuit's judgment, on the ground
that the court of appeals should have assigned counsel to assist the
defendant in prosecuting his application for leave to appeal in forma
pauperis. This was a course which Judge Frank had also urged in his
dissent.
The cost of printing briefs and records on appeal is another item which
seems quite clearly to fall within the ambit of the Griffin decision, al-
though the United States Supreme Court did not expressly consider it.
New York and a minority of states require printing although there are
some exceptions, 5 since 1954 the appellate division has discretion to
83 238 F.2d at 566.
84 352 U.S. 565 (1957).
85 See Institute of Judicial Administration, Criminal Appeals (1954), Tables IV, V and VI
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relax the printing requirements.86 The third department has allowed type-
written papers since that year. Motions, in forma pauperis, for leave to
appeal on the original transcript and typewritten briefs have been
granted sparingly. However, since Griffin, we have reason to believe that
these motions are being treated more liberally.
THE EFFECT UPON ASSIGNMENT OF COUNSEL
There is a probability that the Griffin decision will eventually be
construed to require a state to furnish reasonably competent counsel to
all indigent persons accused of serious crimess 6a
Realistically this should be inevitable. There is no protection against
wrongful conviction like a good criminal lawyer. As Justice Suther-
land said in Powell v. Alabama:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If
charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without
a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill
and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a
perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is
it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.8 7
A system of justice which undertakes, as a part of its fundamental
philosophy, to protect all individuals from the risks of false conviction,
simply must provide counsel to all those in need. Otherwise no meaning-
ful trial is offered.
Since the classic discussion in Powell v. Alabama, the right to counsel
has been looked upon solely in terms of the requirements of due process.
The "fair trial standard" which the court has applied in right to counsel
cases is a due process standard. The Griffin case suggests a new depar-
ture.88 By that same legal alchemy by which the failure to provide a
transcript has been held to violate both the due process and equal
protection clauses, failure to provide counsel may likewise be seen in the
86 N.Y. Rules of Civil Practice, rule 234 as amended.
86a Griffin has already been held to require a federal court to advise an infant of his
right to counsel in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. Shioutakon v. District of Columbia,
236 F.2d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
87 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
88 justice Schaefer in "Federalism and State Criminal Procedure," 'O Harv. L. Rev.
1, 9-10 (1956), discusses this point.
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double perspective of due process and equal protection. A person accused
of a serious crime who is without counsel to defend him on account of
poverty is not receiving that protection of the law which those who can
afford counsel receive. Thus, even though, of itself, the failure to provide
counsel may not be violative of the due process clause, in conjunction
with the violation of equal protection, there is a constitutional
wrong of sufficient moment to fall afoul of the fourteenth amendment.
Mr. Robert C. Casad, in the Michigan Law Review,89 suggests that
the Griffin decision extends only to unjust discriminations which com-
pletely shut the court's door in the face of the poor person. Only when
counsel are a sine qua non of getting into court at all, he says, should the
appointment of counsel become a requirement of due process. But could
there be a more sophistical legal fiction? "Law addresses itself to actuali-
ties," said Justice Frankfurter in the Griffin case,.9 and this theme runs
through Black's and Frankfurter's opinions. Can it be supposed that
these devoted and clear-sighted Justices, and those who concurred with
them, will now say that there is a difference in kind between giving a
convict no hearing at all and giving him a hearing under a killing handi-
cap? Will not the failure to provide an adequate hearing, like the failure
to provide an adequate appeal, run afoul of both the equal protection and
due process clauses?
A small fraction of criminal convictions are appealed. Therefore
the number of cases in which injustice can be done by denying or restrict-
ing appeal is relatively small. The number of cases in which injustice is
done by failing to provide counsel at trial is very much greater.91
To condone the second but condemn the first would be a retrogression
to the sort of legal fiction for which modern and realistic judges would
blush in shame. It would be a sort of judicial recidivism. It would be
to take shelter from the inconvenient realities by a comfortable reliance
on the fiction that so long as the accused can be brought to the court,
due process is not concerned with the condition in which he may be
brought there.
As students of the administration of criminal justice, the authors must,
in honesty, urge a further point which they know will seem radical to
many. Counsel must not only be appointed; counsel must be paid. And
counsel must have funds for the preparation of the defendant's case.
The bland assumption that counsel, from sheer sense of duty, from
pleasure in being chosen, from desire to make a reputation, will do their
89 55 Mich. L. Rev. at 420.
90 351 U.S. at 23.
91 See Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American Courts c. 4 and Appendices I and
II (1955) for a discussion of the right to counsel as interpreted by state courts and for
tabular treatment of the comparative provisions of the forty-eight states.
[Vol. 43
THE GRIFFIN CASE
utmost for their "shotgun" clients, is often no more than a pious hope.
In many instances they will; and will dig into their own pockets to do
what urgently needs doing to win a client's case. Lawyers are profes-
sional people; therefore many of them will do these things. But lawyers
are also businessmen; therefore many will not do these things. Many
who sincerely intend to do their utmost for assigned clients will in
actuality do something less than their utmost, because of the competing
demands of regular clients upon their limited supply of time. This is
human nature. Who denies its effects is living in a dream world.
Thus in 1943 the late Judge Augustus Hand, in a report to the Judicial
Conference of Senior Circuit Court Judges, made the statement which is
now a classic in this field:
It is clear that when cases of poor persons needing defense become
numerous and occur repeatedly, the voluntary and uncompensated services
of counsel are not an adequate means of providing representation. To
call on lawyers constantly for unpaid service is unfair to them and any
attempt to do so is almost bound to break down after a time. To distribute
such assignments among a large number of attorneys in order to reduce the
burden upon anyone, is to entrust the representation of the defendant to
attorneys who in many cases are not proficient in criminal trials, what-
ever their general ability, and who for one reason or another cannot be
depended upon for an adequate defense. Too often under such circum-
stances the representation becomes little more than a form. 2
RETROACTMTY
Frankfurter's opinion, alone, asserts that the rule of the Griffin case
is new law and should not operate retroactively. He fears jail deliveries.
He urges that courts are not impaled on the horns of the dilemma, of
either following bad precedent for the sake of stability or, alternatively,
of changing a rule retroactively. Since no other judge agreed, and since
Harlan commented that Black's opinion was not so limited, it would
seem that when a case arises presenting the problem of retroactivity
the Court will decide that Griffin did have a retroactive effect. The
Illinois Supreme Court took this view. 3
On the merits, Frankfurter's theory is irresistible, that no inexorable
logic demands that case law be retroactive. There is no metaphysical
block which prevents saying that judges make law, so long as they do it
in homeopathic doses. But a brief inspection of the cases which Frank-
furter cites and some of the many others on this subject suggest to us the
advantage of a selective approach. If reliance on then existing law is an
important factor, retroactivity will perhaps not be indulged in. But if it
92 As quoted in Brownell, Legal Aid in United States p. 138 (1951).
93 See note 15 supra. For an adoption and application of Frankfurter's theory, see
Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, supra note 86a at 670, and Matter of Schaeffer, 126
A.2d 870 (Mun. Ct. of App. D.C. 1956).
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is not, retroactivity will be more likely. There may be many other factors
involved, and a judge will, according to the selective approach which
seems to us most reasonable, have to weigh all these factors in deciding.
To obviate the danger which Justice Frankfurter fears would arise if a
retroactive effect should be given to the Griffin rule, Judge Schaefer of
Illinois has advocated a system of screening, for merit, applications for
writs of federal habeas corpus by state convicts.4 Perhaps some similar
procedure could both protect individual rights and prevent a flooding of
the courts.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps petitioner Griffin's name was fated. The creature of fable
which bore that name had the head and wings of an eagle, "the bird
of freedom," while it had the more earthbound body of a lion. We have
examined here some of the first consequences of the narrow holding of
Griffin. But its broader influences can hardly be foreseen. It is of the
very genius of our common law that a principle such as is embodied in
the Griffin case can find fruition only in the work of thousands of indi-
vidual judges and other lawmakers. To the extent that the principle of
the Griffin case finds acceptance it will constitute a new charter of free-
dom for the poor. It will be years, perhaps decades, however, before we
can know whether the Griffin "eagle" will fly or will remain earthbound.
Some cases expand and grow; other cases wither and die. Griffin will
meet vast obstacles: inertia, complacency, economy, bitter resentment.
The resentment is already at hand. The General Assembly of Georgia
recently adopted a resolution seeking the impeachment of six of the
Justices of the United States Supreme Court, for "attempting to subvert
the Constitution of the United States, and . . . giving aid or comfort to
the enemies of the United States .... " To explain this attack the Resolu-
tion was followed by criticism of fifteen decisions by the United States
Supreme Court. The first decision mentioned is the Griffin Case. The
General Assembly of Georgia said of it:
The effect of this decision is to place upon each of the states the duty of
guaranteeing the financial ability of every communist and felon to exercise
constitutional rights.95
If this be its effect, the Griffin case does indeed fulfill the constitu-
tional guarantee that all persons, including communists and felons, have
equal access to the process of law.
94 See Schaefer, "Federalism and Criminal Procedure," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 25 (1956).
95 A Resolution Requesting Impeachment of Six Members of the United States Supreme
Court, adopted February 22, 1957. The legislature of Florida adopted a similar though less
scathing resolution also mentioning the Griffin case. 1956 Florida Sessions Laws at 401.
See also, State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, - Fla. -, 93 So. 2d 354, 357 (1957)
(U.S. Supreme Court appeal pending).
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